Commercial Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation by Baker, Steven J.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
PEACE STUDIES PROGRAM
Occasional Papers
COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER AND 
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
by Steven J. Baker
Number 5

Commercial Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation
Steven J. Baker
Research Associate 
Peace Studies Program
Cornell University
PEACE STUDIES PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 5
May 1975
Steven J. Baker holds a doctorate in political science 
from the University of California at Los Angeles. Dr. 
Baker's paper was written while he was a post-doctoral 
Research Associate of the Peace Studies Program of 
Cornell University's Center for International Studies.

Commercia1 Nuclear Power and Nuclear Proliferation
INTRODUCTION
In the last year concern has grown over the implica­
tions of nuclear energy exports: intense competition among 
advanced industrial countries to export nuclear reactors, 
fuels, and fuel processing facilities has increased fears 
about accelerating the acquisition of nuclear weapons 
capabilities in Third World countries. This concern has 
reportedly generated an examination of the possibility of a 
common approach to the problem of nuclear exports on the 
part of some of the nuclear exporting nations—the United 
States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France, West Germany, 
Canada, Japan, and Italy.
In the United States, congressional concern has resulted 
in a proposal to revise the standards and procedures govern­
ing nuclear exports. Opposition to these unilateral restric­
tions is strong in various parts of the bureaucracy, in the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and in the nuclear industry.
This paper surveys the development of the international 
nuclear energy market, with particular reference to America's 
role in this process. The emphasis is on the interplay 
between the commercial promotion of nuclear energy and the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, between domestic and foreign 
policies, and the implications of domestic energy policy 
choices for future nuclear weapons proliferation.
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COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
India has demonstrated in practice what has always 
been recognized in principle: a nuclear weapons option 
may be spun-off from a peaceful nuclear energy program.1 
Whereas the nuclear energy programs of the first five nuclear 
weapons states were the outgrowth of essentially military 
programs, India's point of departure was a civil nuclear
2 
program and as such represents an important and portentous 
variant in nuclear proliferation.
The danger inherent in the international spread of 
nuclear energy was recognized from the beginning. The Soviet 
Union and the United States have sought to deal with this 
danger in two interrelated ways: generally to create the 
international political conditions in which there would be 
little incentive to exercise a weapons option; and more spe­
cifically, to erect an international web of technical depen­
dency relationships that would allow them to control the 
domestic nuclear development of other nations.
Neither of these approaches has been completely success­
ful. By maintaining nuclear weapons as a permanent part of 
the calculus of national power, the superpowers have perpet­
uated the incentive for other nations to consider a nuclear 
option. The export of nuclear technology has given the 
superpowers some influence in the promotion of certain lines 
of nuclear technology, but has been less effective in block­
ing lines of technology which they did not favor. These 
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policies have not diminished the incentives to go nuclear, 
but they have accelerated other nations' acquisition of 
nuclear weapons capabilities.
These trends are likely to be accentuated in the future 
as a result of the widespread commercialization of nuclear 
energy. The political and economic conditions resulting from 
the creation of an international nuclear energy industry have 
become important parameters that further complicate the task 
of nuclear arms control, parameters that tend to be under­
estimated in arms control studies. Domestic politics and 
national economic interests are involved in any nonprolifer­
ation measure. It is important to understand how far this 
process has gone and why, as a prelude to considering the 
policy alternatives in a world in which nuclear nonprolifer­
ation objectives are increasingly conditioned by economic 
considerations.
THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR MARKET
The present contribution of nuclear energy to meeting 
the world's demand for electricity is still rather limited. 
While there are hundreds of small research reactors around 
the world, there are only about 130 power reactors producing 
electricity in about eighteen nations, numbers that will 
double as new reactors start up in the next four or five
3
years. Similarly, nuclear fuel plants are still relatively 
few in number: for example, there are only thirteen nations 
in the world that have either experimental or industrial
4 
scale fuel reprocessing facilities.
These figures represent little more than the prototype 
stage of the nuclear industry; until the dramatic increase 
in the price of oil following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, 
nuclear power was at best marginally economically competitive 
with conventional energy sources. But in the wake of the 
oil crisis most of the world's industrial nations projected 
heavy increases in reliance on nuclear power, and for the 
first time nuclear energy was being promoted in very small­
sized plants as an economically viable source of electricity
6for developing countries.
The international market for nuclear energy technology, 
hardware, and nuclear fuels is projected to grow enormously. 
Estimates of the dollar value of this market vary, but all 
are impressive: one, an industry set of projections for the 
period 1971 to 1985, estimates a $250 billion investment in 
reactors worldwide, with an additional $45 billion to be 
invested in uranium mining, milling, enrichment, fuel fabri-
7 
cation, and reprocessing. The existence of this kind of 
international market, and the commitment by governments and 
private firms of enormous financial resources to exploit 
this market, constitute a set of political facts of the high­
est importance. Energy supplies have moved to the center of 
national and international political concerns. Political 
desires for maximum national independence in energy (or more 
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aptly, maximum diversity in forms of dependence) often 
conflict with national economic priorities—national indepen­
dence promises to be more expensive in the short run than 
reliance on imported fuels. And in a competitive international 
environment, profit-oriented strategies of nuclear industries, 
some of which are extensions of multinational corporations, 
may not coincide with the political and economic goals of 
governments but must nonetheless be taken into account by 
government policy makers.
The result is an international situation marked by 
intense commercial competition among technologically advanced 
nations, an atmosphere that is scarcely conducive to arms 
control measures. Even where there is substantial government 
commitment to the objective of nuclear nonproliferation, sub- 
governmental bureaucratic and political groups and non-govern­
mental organizations may be pursuing interests that in effect 
contradict arms control objectives. Arms control policies 
must increasingly adjust to a situation in which "low politics" 
kinds of considerations involving economic welfare impinge on 
"high politics" kinds of considerations involving national 
security: increasingly, we are compelled to adjust to what
g 
has been called the "vulgarization of the atomic enterprise."
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COMMERCIALIZATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
American policies are primarily responsible for the 
creation of an international nuclear market with its present 
characteristics. Although nuclear science was international 
before World War II (scientists of thirteen nations worked
9 
on the Manhattan project ) the manner in which science was 
harnessed to industrial capacity to achieve political goals 
is perhaps peculiarly American. The wartime pattern of 
interpenetrating government bureaucracies, university re­
search facilities, and industrial enterprises was perpetuated 
into the postwar period. This made the development of nuclear 
energy a kind of prototype of the phenomenon loosely termed 
the "military-industrial complex."
The United States was instrumental in shaping the 
competitive international environment that frustrated attempts 
at achieving international controls on nuclear weapons. The 
permanent American advantage in nuclear technology that the 
Baruch Plan would have given to the United States was clearly 
unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and had it been accepted by 
the Soviet government, it is not clear that it would have 
been acceptable to the American Congress.^ In the absence 
of an international regime, nuclear weapons became a permanent 
part of the calculus of national power, with the emergence 
over time of successive nuclear weapons states.
The peaceful atom became no less a tool of national 
policy than the atomic bomb, and American predominance in 
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the non-conununi st world helped shape the international 
spread of nuclear energy. While national security concerns 
dominated, calculations of national commercial advantage 
were present from the first in nuclear technology. Even 
during World War II the issue of postwar commercial rights 
to civil nuclear applications contributed to the breakdown 
in cooperation between the United States and Great Britain 
in 194311 and later the question of postwar patent rights 
complicated the problem of the repatriation of French scien-
12 tists who had worked on bomb-related projects m Canada.
In the postwar period, the American government became 
committed to the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. While the 1946 McMahon Act includes the exhortation 
to "further private enterprise," the dominant role assigned 
to the federal government in nuclear affairs was unprecedented 
in peacetime. Civil applications of nuclear science were 
judged to be essential to continuing work on the atomic bomb, 
since nuclear scientists tended to justify their work on the
13 latter in terms of their contributions to the former.
American industry was initially reluctant to become involved 
in nuclear projects, given the scant prospects for immediate 
industrial applications and rigid government controls. But 
ample government financial support, especially in research and
14 development, helped overcome industry's initial diffidence. 
This same government investment in civil nuclear research and 
development helped create a permanent government interest in 
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promoting the commercialization of nuclear energy in order 
to redeem the promises made to the private sector and to 
redeem the government's own considerable commitment.
The creation of the Atomic Energy Commission was crucial. 
The emergence of an effective, expansive bureaucratic actor 
assured that the interests of nuclear energy would be pur­
sued within the government.16 And the political support of 
important Congressional leaders, concentrated in the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, provided a critical link between 
17private interests and bureaucratic policy. These several 
sources of nuclear policy were often at odds with one another
18over questions like public versus private power. But there 
was also a minimal agreement on a common goal: that nuclear 
energy should be promoted to the point where it was a com­
mercially viable technology, a dependable alternative to 
coal and oil as a means of generating electricity. Despite 
persistent differences, the agreement of disparate groups on 
this general goal was sufficient to give American nuclear 
energy policy in the 1950s and early 1960s a certain coher­
ence and effectiveness. It was this policy that allowed the 
United States to establish itself as the dominant force in 
the world nuclear energy market.
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPREAD OF 
NUCLEAR ENERGY
These domestic interests are sufficient to account for 
the government’s attempts to promote the commercialization 
of nuclear energy, but not its internationalization. Indeed, 
in the wake of the rejection of the Baruch Plan and with the 
1946 McMahon Act, the trend was in the opposite direction. 
Under the policy of nuclear secrecy, nuclear sharing with 
Great Britain and Canada was terminated and the United States 
consciously sought to preserve its nuclear weapons monopoly 
through a policy of restricted access to nuclear technology.
It is generally conceded that the policy of nuclear 
secrecy was a failure. The Russian detonation of an A-bomb 
in 1949 and the British A-bomb detonation in 1952 confirmed
19this proposition. But at a distance of twenty-five years, 
the conclusion that the United States should actively promote 
the international spread of nuclear reactors because the 
Soviet Union and Great Britain had exploded nuclear weapons 
requires some explanation.
In the narrowest sense, nuclear secrecy had failed to 
prevent others from acquiring nuclear weapons. But in order 
to develop independently a nuclear weapons capability, the 
Soviet Union and Britain had had to make enormous economic 
and technical exertions, many of which merely duplicated 
American efforts. Their achievements were as much as any­
thing an example of the staggering costs of breaking the 
American nuclear monopoly, not the ease of doing so. Indeed, 
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this seems to have been the conclusion of those American 
policy makers, especially in Congress, who opposed aiding 
allies like France in acquiring nuclear weapons and opposed
20 simply giving nuclear weapons to allies. What could not 
be prevented could at least be subjected to substantial 
penalties in terms of resources and effort.
And yet, the United States did proceed to promote 
nuclear energy internationally and thereby help to reduce 
the technical barriers and material costs of acquiring a 
nuclear weapons option, a policy difficult to reconcile with 
the arms control objectives with which it was justified. In 
fact, the Atoms-for-Peace proposal was only in part a reflec­
tion of arms control objectives. Some of the convergent 
influences were completely contrary to arms control aims, 
others only partially or potentially so, but the internal 
contradictions of the Atoms-for-Peace approach were evident 
from the beginning.
The most contradictory element that contributed to 
this approach is clear in the genesis of the proposal itself 
within the Eisenhower Administration. In the course of the 
policy debate over whether or not the United States should 
build and deploy the H-bomb, Robert Oppenheimer argued that 
the U.S. public should be fully informed of the dangers of 
thermonuclear weapons; he and other scientists urged that 
strict nuclear secrecy be ended. This original appeal for 
"candor" in confronting the dangers of the H-bomb was 
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transformed over a series of breakfast conferences at the 
White House into the Atoms-for-Peace proposal of December, 
1953. In part, the Atoms-for-Peace proposal helped to 
render politically acceptable in America and the world the 
government's decision to go ahead with the H-bomb.
This is not to say that Atoms-for-Peace did not have 
an arms control objective, with its proposal for the creation 
of a pool of fissile materials withdrawn from the weapons 
stocks of the nuclear powers. And of course, the creation 
of an International Atomic Energy Agency to regulate these 
fissile materials was a major international arms control 
initiative. It was the failure to achieve the first of 
these goals, with the consequent relegation of the IAEA to 
the status of a marginal technical agency, that is most 
frequently criticized, a failure for which American policy
22 was partly responsible.
But it is curious that even though the international 
political framework that would have made the Atoms-for- 
Peace approach a constructive arms control initiative was 
not realized, the international promotion of nuclear energy 
continued; the result was that the pace of nuclear weapons 
capabilities was accelerated as nations gained greater 
access to plutonium produced in power reactors and to weapons
23relevant technologies. This apparent paradox was the re­
sult of the convergence in the Atoms-for-Peace proposal of 
an arms control rationale and domestic political interests.
i
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It became a tenet of American policy that the spread of 
nuclear technology was inevitable and therefore that it 
was wise to seek to control that which could not be pre­
vented. Atoms-for-Peace was designed to spread American 
controls internationally by means of spreading American 
nuclear technology and hardware. The political support 
generated for the proposal in America rested on the com­
patibility of the government's international political 
objectives with the nuclear industry's commercial interests.
Agreement on the "inevitability" of the spread of 
nuclear technology left only the timing of its spread as a 
relevant political consideration: convinced of the benefits 
of nuclear energy and the utility of its spread under 
American tutelage, there seemed to be no good reason not 
to accelerate the process.
In retrospect, the assumption that the spread of nuclear 
technology was inevitable seems open to question. The develop­
ment and spread of nuclear technology are better understood 
as flowing from prior political choices rather than as the 
result of "inexorable laws governing the flow of scientific 
information." The postwar priority of nuclear physics in 
governments' research and development allocations, the choice 
among various reactor types, the size, number and location of 
power reactors and fuel processing plants around the world 
are primarily the outcomes of political processes, and were 
promoted and subsidized by governments.
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Furthermore, by accelerating the spread of nuclear 
energy the United States was helping to undermine its own 
political position. It was assumed that reliance on Ameri­
can-supplied nuclear energy technology and nuclear fuels 
would give the United States additional political leverage. 
But the greater the role nuclear power came to play in a 
nation's energy mix, the less politically tolerable con­
tinued dependence on America became. Again, this is easier 
to see in retrospect than it was in the mid 1950s. But the 
kind of hubris reflected in these earlier American policies 
is not altogether lacking in more recent nuclear export 
initiatives.
Secretary of State Dulles' version of the inevitable 
spread of nuclear energy was sensitive to both domestic and 
international politics. Before a Congress wary of inter­
national inspections, Dulles argued that nuclear plants 
would spread first under American promotion and controls, 
but that sovereign nations would not long tolerate inspec-
• 
tion by other sovereign nations. The IAEA was essential, 
Dulles argued, "...if we want long-term and safe foreign 
r 25markets for our nuclear materials and technology."
The American concern about international exports under 
controls is sometimes explained as a function of American 
fears that the Soviet Union was poised to make a major effort 
in spreading its political influence through the export of
2 6civil nuclear technology. While credible in the political
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atmosphere of the time, there is little in the record 
to suggest that this was in fact the Soviet intent. The 
Soviet Union has consistently been more reluctant to 
export nuclear technology and hardware than the United 
States, and when it has done so it has most often been 
to nations whose political subordination to the Soviet 
Union acted as a control on the uses to which the techno-
27logy would be put.
British, not Soviet, nuclear exports seem to have 
been the dominant preoccupation of American policymakers. 
The British nuclear energy program commanded relatively 
impressive resources in the immediate postwar period. 
With more pressing energy needs than the United States, 
Great Britain specialized earlier and gained initial
2 8 successes with its natural uranium fueled reactor type.
By 1952-3 the British seemed a step ahead of the American 
nuclear industry—and were aggressively seeking commercial 
outlets overseas. American industry opposed the policy of 
nuclear secrecy as the major obstacle to commercial nuclear 
power in the United States, and as an impediment to meeting 
foreign competition. This was the commercial challenge to 
which the Atoms-for-Peace proposal was designed to respond.
By the mid 1950s the lag in nuclear power installation 
in America threatened the nuclear industry with an excess 
in productive capacity while the potential overseas market
29was estimated at $30 billion. Electricity produced by 
conventional fuels was too cheap in America for nuclear
power to compete economically, but overseas, especially in 
-15-
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Western Europe, the costs of conventional fuels were 
higher and fuel supplies were largely imported. Thus, 
Americans looked to foreign markets to bolster a flagging 
domestic nuclear industry. And the American government, 
with its own enormous investment in nuclear energy, was 
prepared to actively promote the commercialization abroad 
of nuclear energy. Under the Atoms-for-Peace program, 
bilateral agreements were concluded with forty-three 
nations between 1955 and 1958, involving the transfer 
of research and power reactors subsidized by the United 
States government, in addition to exchanges of technology 
and personnel.30 All of this required the revision of 
American statutes regarding nuclear energy which were 
progressively liberalized, especially in 1954 and 1958, 
to permit and encourage the commercialization and inter-
31 nationalization of nuclear energy. While these bilateral 
agreements fell short of the exaggerated expectations of 
the American nuclear industry, they did succeed in stimu­
lating foreign interest in nuclear energy despite the lag 
in American nuclear power installation.
Where the most obvious tensions arose between the 
policies of international commercial promotion and arms 
control, the tension was dissipated in favor of commercial
/ 
promotion. Thus when the Euratom countries refused both 
direct American inspection and international inspection 
under the IAEA, the United States allowed them the right 
32 of self inspection. This was a politically important
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concession that rendered the IAEA inspection system still­
born but opened an attractive international market to the
33American nuclear industry.
In practice, the prevalence of American technology 
on the international nuclear market did have positive 
implications for arms control: American enriched uranium 
fueled reactors produce only about one-half the plutonium 
that natural uranium reactor types do; American pressure 
vessel reactors can only be refueled with costly and 
obvious reactor shut-downs, making it difficult to hide 
any diversion of fissile materials from the fuel elements; 
American reactors have been dependent on the AEC for fuels 
and are subject therefore to periodic inspection. All of 
these are positive contributions to nuclear arms control 
and may have had some effect on the choice of reactor types 
by various nations in the spate of power reactor orders of 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. Those governments and 
utilities interested in long-term independence in nuclear 
technology may have favored British natural uraniums fueled
34reactor types, but the American government's willingness 
to offset the disadvantages of dependence with attractive 
financial packages seems to have been crucial in winning
. 35several of the early international competitions.
Finally, there is little evidence to suggest that 
these arms control implications played any major role in 
the American selection of reactor types to pursue commer­
cially. The successful light water reactor was a spinoff 
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from the submarine reactor program. Alternatives were 
eliminated as a result of technical and economic criteria. 
Like the British, American industries simply exported
3 6what they had to sell.
Arms control and commercial promotion, at best 
convergent interests but never really the logical ends 
and means of a coherent policy, have grown increasingly 
incompatible. Despite the failure of nuclear power to 
emerge as economically competitive without government
37subsidies until the late 1960s, an international 
nuclear industry was established. This industry is 
generally composed of the nuclear power divisions of 
huge electronics companies, many of which operate as 
subsidiaries or licensees of multinational corporations 
based in the United States. In the major industrial 
countries, the predominance of licensing is a result of 
the political preference of governments for the highest 
possible degree of national independence in nuclear 
technology; licensing of a national company seems polit­
ically preferable to direct foreign investment. There is 
considerable competition to export to countries without 
established nuclear industries not only among American 
firms, but between them and former licensees (e.g. German 
competition for reactor orders in Argentina and Brazil), 
or even with firms that are presently licensees (e.g.
French competition for Iranian reactor orders). There is 
also competition between different lines of reactor 
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technology (e.g. the American enriched uranium fueled 
reactor versus the Canadian natural uranium fueled 
reactor). A kind of global division of labor may be 
emerging in which, for example, Japanese licensees of 
American multinationals might compete for smaller sized 
reactor exports to Southeast Asia while leaving the 
larger reactors to American firms.
This emerging pattern of competition is symbolic 
of broader political changes that are transforming the 
American-dominated postwar international system. Nuclear 
energy is politically attractive for advanced industrial 
countries because of the independence from energy imports 
it affords. Nations which must import their nuclear 
power plants and fuels see this as a way of increasing 
national independence through diversifying energy sources. 
As international competition in the nuclear industry 
intensifies, it reduces the prospect for exercising 
political influence through nuclear exports. Despite the 
"interdependence" of the industrialized nations, there is 
little evidence of a perception of common interest that 
could make nuclear exporters into a cartel with the 
political influence of OPEC.
But these industrial competitors have at least one 
thing in common: they have an interest in the pursuit of 
their economic activities with a minimum of political 
restrictions. This interest is shared in part with their 
national governments: restrictions that reduce the inter­
national competiveness of a nation's nuclear industry
-19-
diminish the prospects for significant foreign trade
i
agreements, and perhaps reduce the industry's ability to 
meet pressing domestic energy needs as well. The political 
pressures exerted by this kind of constellation of govern­
ment and private interests have been important and will 
become increasingly so in the future. The question is 
whether arms control objectives, already eroded, will 
become completely submerged in the future by commercial 
objectives.
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF NUCLEAR POWER AND THE NPT
International commercial competition has always been 
an obstacle to attempts to control conventional armaments. 
But it was not until the NPT negotiations that nuclear arms 
control measures confronted commercial calculations openly 
and directly. And it was in relation to the NPT that the 
corrosive effects of the commercialization of nuclear energy 
on the prospects for nuclear arms control became most evident.
As originally tabled in 1967, the joint Soviet-American 
draft NPT emphasized the restrictions to be placed on the 
Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWSs) and down-played the obli­
gations of the Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs). Even as 
revised, the Treaty remains an unequal one in which obliga­
tions and responsibilities are clearly unbalanced. To some 
extent, this imbalance mirrors the present international 
system in which power is differentially distributed. But 
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many governments saw the Treaty as an attempt to legitimize 
and perpetuate these international disparities: these gov­
ernments needed no additional reason to reject the NPT.
Other NNWS governments were willing to overlook the 
political inequalities of the Treaty because of their sup­
port for the arms control objective that the Treaty embodied, 
but even some of these had reason to object to the commercial 
effects of the NPT which were so clearly discriminatory as 
to add economic injury to political insult. It was argued 
that the inspection of the nuclear industries of the NNWSs 
would put them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the 
NWSs and non-parties to the Treaty. The fear was voiced 
that industrial espionage would be facilitated by opening 
domestic industries to IAEA inspectors, especially where 
such inspectors might be citizens of countries with which 
there were long-standing political differences. There were 
complaints that the Treaty would have the effect of restrict­
ing the international exchange of nuclear technology and 
information with the result of retarding the nuclear progress 
of the NNWSs.
While the United States had consistently hailed the 
economic advantages of nuclear energy, the American-backed 
NPT seemed particularly insensitive to the commercial aspects 
of nuclear technology. Understandably, there was some 
suspicion that the superpowers were pursuing their economic 
advantages in the guise of nuclear arms control, and conse­
-21-
quently many nations demanded revisions of the draft Treaty
39to mitigate its most serious economic defects.
In the NWSs, there was a tendency to reject these kinds 
of objections as masking a desire on the part of certain 
nations to preserve nuclear weapons options. The vigor with 
which some of these arguments were voiced by nations like 
India and Brazil whose nuclear industries have only marginal 
roles in the world market made these arguments suspect—all 
the more so when they were linked to advocacy of the right to
4 0peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs). But these arguments 
were also made by nations like West Germany, Italy, and Japan 
and were perfectly consonant with their national economic 
concerns. Their adoption of these arguments was ultimately 
most persuasive in convincing the United States and the 
Soviet Union to give additional emphasis to Artivle IV's 
exhortation to promote the international exchange of civil 
nuclear technology.
The demands of the NNWSs went far beyond this kind of 
generic commitment on the part of the NWSs. A relevant 
example is the set of proposals advanced by the Italian 
government in August 1967, which was influential in the 
elaboration of recommendations by the Conference of NNWSs
41in 1968. The thrust of these proposals was to give the 
NNWSs signatories to the NPT concrete economic and technical 
rewards for accession to the Treaty: they sought to commit 
explicitly the NWSs to transfer civil nuclear technology to 
-22-
the NNWSs and in particular to guarantee enriched uranium
42fuel supplies to NNWSs at less than market cost. These 
proposals were in line with the aims of the original Atoms- 
for-Peace proposal which would have furthered disarmament by 
creating a pool of fissile fuels taken from nuclear weapons 
stocks, and would have gone a long way towards redressing 
the imbalance of obligations under the NPT. The■political 
inequalities would have remained, but the unacceptability of 
these inequalities would have been mitigated by the concrete 
benefits derived from participation in the Treaty.
The NWSs rejected all of the more specific commitments 
but the American government was not completely unresponsive 
to the demands of teh NNWSs. President Johnson offered to 
place all of America's nuclear industry under IAEA inspection 
43 except for any part explicity related to national security, 
an offer echoed by Great Britain but not by the Soviet Union. 
This gesture reduced the force of the argument that the 
United States was seeking to maintain its commercial advan­
tage at the expense of competitors. However, since inspections 
were conditional on the entering into full force of the IAEA 
inspection system elsewhere, they have yet to be applied to 
American industry. The nation for which such inspections are 
presumably the least objectionable, the United States, will
44 be the last to be inspected rather than the first.
The NNWSs' refusal to assume the burden of producing 
and supplying nuclear fuels for NNWSs is particularly inter­
esting and important. The AEC has had a monopoly on the 
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non-communist world's upply of commercial enriched uranium 
and has consciously manipulated this monopoly as a tool of 
American nonproliferation policy. Thus, the United States 
successfully blocked efforts on the part of Euratom countries 
to build on enrichment plant in 1957-58 by manipulating terms
45and prices of American-supplied uranium. Maintaining a 
fuel monopoly under the aegis of the NPT would have been a 
logical extension of this policy.
But the commercialization of nuclear power, dominated • 
by the American LWR, resulted in enormous increases in pro­
jected demands for enrichment services. For the NWSs to 
assume the obligation to provide fuel services for all the 
NNWSs signatories to the Treaty could have quickly amounted 
to a commitment of several billion dollars per year on the 
part of the AEC requiring greatly expanded plant capacity;
and of course, the AEC would be under strong political 
pressure not to charge commercial rates for these obligations 
assumed under international treaty—just as the NWSs are 
obligated to provide PNEs at less than market cost under 
the NPT's Article V. The United States government was under­
standably reluctant to undertake this kind of responsibility. 
These projected increases in demand led American and foreign 
industrial interests to eye the uranium enrichment field as 
an attractive commercial proposition. The prospective 
commercialization of this last area of government nuclear 
monopoly made it an unlikely area for international commitments 
on a noncommercial basis.
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This kind of economic consideration precluded any
American government use of its enrichment monopoly as a 
tool of its arms control policy: the means adopted for 
spreading American controls, the commercialization of 
nuclear energy based on American fuel supplies, began to 
envelop the goal of arms control. The commitment of Article 
IV to the "fullest possible exchange" of nuclear energy
4 6 technology implies an obligation to share nuclear technology.
But in practice, market forces are increasingly the only
. 47mechanism for international nuclear technology transfers.
The possible economic costs of Treaty adherence were easy to 
imagine; the economic benefits were hard to discern. The 
result was to weaken the appeal of the NPT to those nations 
which might have been susceptible to economic inducements. 
Even where these nations signed and eventually ratified the 
Treaty, it was with the kind of profound political reservations
48 which undermine the Treaty's broader goals.
POLITICAL CONTROLS AND ENRICHED URANIUM
The long-term impact of the NPT on proliferation has 
yet to be seen. But one short-term impact has been to help 
to reduce obstacles to the spread of weapons relevant technol­
ogies, particularly in the nuclear fuel sector. The accep­
tance of IAEA safeguards by NNWSs makes it politically difficult 
for NWS parties to the Treaty to resist demands for purchases
49of fuel processing and enrichment technologies. Interest in 
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these technologies has grown as the debate on the Treaty 
sensitized many nations to the importance of nuclear 
technology to national independence and economic well­
being at the same time that it called into question estab­
lished patterns of dependence, particularly on the United 
States, for supplies of enriched uranium for power reactor
. i 50 fuels.
By the end of the 1960s, the goal of providing com­
mercially viable nuclear power was essentially achieved: 
nuclear power was marginally economical in many nations 
and promised to be even more economical in the future. One 
of the consequences of this was the tendency for American 
nuclear energy policy to lose its relative coherence; the 
generalized support from disparate groups seemed to crumble. 
The scientific community began to split over the wisdom of 
nuclear power as environmental and safety concerns grew. 
The AEC vascillated between promoting the nuclear industry 
and promoting its institutional interests through increased 
vigilance in its regulatory functions. The JCAE was 
increasingly ambivalent about the proper degree of govern­
ment participation in nuclear industrial undertakings while 
industrial circles grew restive under government controls 
now that government promotional activities seemed less 
essential. This loss of policy coherence was to have 
important arms control implications, especially in the field
A
of uranium enrichment.
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The American international inspections system depended 
on American dominance of the uranium enrichment sector: the 
right to inspection has not been tied to the nuclear reactor 
but to the fissile fuels supplied to run the reactor. 
Anticipating a huge market at home and abroad, in the late 
1960s the American industrial interests began to press the 
government to allow a private takeover of the $2.3 billion 
gaseous diffusion enrichment plants that the AEC had operated
51 as a government monopoly since the end of World War II.
The advent of the Nixon administration provided a sympathetic 
political context in Washington, and it became established 
administration policy to move towards the "privatization" of
52the enrichment facilities. Under increasing public pressure, 
the AEC seemed inclined to exercise more regulatory controls 
over the industry under which the nuclear industry increasingly 
chafed; but the future of the AEC itself was in question and 
it tended to be relatively acquiescent on the question of the 
future of the enrichment facilities, prepared to entertain a
53 number of possibilities. The most open opposition came from 
members of the JCAE, some of whom seemed reluctant to see the 
government lose a monopoly and others who feared that priva­
tization would result in higher enrichment charges and reduced 
54economic viability of nuclear energy. The result was a 
period of uncertainty in American enrichment policy in which 
foreign customers of the AEC could not be sure of the ability 
or willingness of the government to continue to supply their 
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fuel needs. Two successive price rises with the promise of 
more to come made the search for alternatives to continued 
dependence on the United States all the more attractive.55 
The Nixon Administration's responsiveness to domestic polit­
ical interests was matched by its indifference to the inter­
national consequences of its acts.
American policy changes coincided with a technological 
breakthrough in Western Europe that provided a possible 
alternative to continued dependence on the United States for 
enriched uranium supplies. In 1970, after a lengthy process 
of negotiations, the British, Dutch and West Germans signed 
an intergovernmental agreement to establish a consortium for 
the production of enriched uranium on a commercial basis in
56 competition with the United States. The technology used 
in this process has important proliferation implications: 
consuming much less electricity than the gaseous diffusion 
process, centrifuge separation will be economical on virtually 
any plant scale and could be concealed in a modest-sized 
laboratory. In the early 1960s the American government was 
sufficiently concerned about the implications of this tech­
nology to persuade the British and German governments to 
classify their centrifuge research, and to halt private
57American research on this technology by 1967. But when the 
tripartite consortium was announced, the American nuclear 
industry began to pressure the government to give them access 
to classified research on the centrifuge and on gaseous
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diffusion—and argued that the failure to do so would put
%
them at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their European
5 8 counterparts. The government responded with the Domestic 
Access Program through which American industries have 
launched research and development efforts aimed at possible
59 future commercial enrichment ventures.
The tripartitie consortium was not the only inter­
national alternative to American enriched uranium to emerge 
in the years since the NPT came into force. The French 
relaunched their effort to get European backing for a 
commercial scale gaseous diffusion plant based on French 
technology; a French Commissariat a 1'Energie Atomique policy 
goal from the mid-1950s, such a plant had become a national 
imperative after the 1969 decision by President Pompidou to 
abandon the French national natural uranium fueled reactor. 
The Commission of the EEC favored this kind of project as a
61 means of reviving Euratom. And France sought to open its 
Eurodif Association to non-governmental interests in hope 
of luring support from the private sector in West Germany and 
Britain where the governments were already committed to the
6 2 rival centrifuge process. But in the end, France was forced 
to go ahead with the financial backing of Italy, Belgium,
6 3 Spain, and at the last moment, Iran.
The evolution of the French gaseous diffusion project 
from a venture under the sponsorship of the European commu­
nities to one including Spain and Iran is symbolic of the
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corrosion of established political ties through international 
commercial competition in nuclear energy. Intense nationalism 
had already deprived Euratom of its integrative impact. As 
one more step in this process, the French gaseous diffusion 
project passed from a context of maximum potential inter­
national political commitments (and therefore, also maximum 
potential mutual constraints) and became merely another 
international economic arrangement with minimal political 
commitments (and therefore, minimal political constraints).
France has also entertained proposals for exporting
64enrichment plants to Canada and Australia. The tripartite 
consortium has likewise speculated on future exports of 
centrifuge plants. In order to head off the development of 
overseas competition, since 1971 the American government has 
offered to share enrichment technology with friendly coun­
tries.^ The Soviet Union, South Africa and other nations 
are entering the commercial enrichment field.Uranium 
enrichment facilities are clearly becoming an international 
commercial commodity, and technological innovations like 
laser isotope separation will become a part of this intense 
international competition. These trends promise not only to 
remove any technical barriers to the proliferation of nuclear
I
weapons capabilities but actually to encourage appetites for 
acquisition of such capabilities.
This kind of commercial competition among industrial 
countries has undermined arms control policies. For example, 
in 1973 and 1974 the United States intensified its efforts 
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to convince the Japanese government to ratify the NPT as 
part of its larger political objectives in Asia. One of 
the arguments used by American spokesmen was that it might 
be impossible for the United States to continue to supply 
the Japanese nuclear industry with enriched uranium fuels
6 7 if the Japanese government failed to ratify the NPT. But 
since the terms for American enriched uranium supplies were 
being stiffened and the future reliability of American 
commitments was open to question, the Japanese were already 
seeking alternative sources of supply, especially for the
6 8longer term. At this point the Soviet Union approached 
the Japanese with an offer to provide enrichment services 
on terms that were commercially very competitive with those 
of the United States; but the Soviet Union apparently also 
demanded prior NPT ratification by Japan.69 The French had 
also approached the Japanese government to gain Japanese 
financing of a French designed plant to be built in Australia 
Meanwhile, Japanese utilities became major customers of the
71 French-backed Eurodif Association without Japan having to 
meet any political preconditions like NPT ratification.
The loss of the American monopoly on the commercial 
supplies of enriched uranium has eliminated the principal 
American lever in influencing other nations' nuclear energy 
policies. This American policy was finally discredited 
completely in the summer of 1974 when President Nixon offered 
nuclear reactors and fuels to Egypt and Israel apparently
70
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7 2 without any demand that they first ratify the NPT. This 
offer was an affront to the Japanese and others who were
«
being asked to assume more stringent kinds of commitments, 
and was an initiative that seemed to negate any advantages 
to be gained by adherence to the NPT by rewarding those who 
chose to reject the Treaty.
The congress was sufficiently concerned about the 
proliferation implications of reactor and fuel exports to 
the Middle East to reserve the final approval of any such 
transfers. In the preceding months, Secretary Kissenger had 
repeatedly offered to share uranium enrichment technology 
with other industrial nations as an inducement for cooper­
ation in dealing with the oil crisis: the reactor offers to 
the Middle East may have been part of this broader policy. 
Administration spokesmen defended those proposed exports 
with arguments grounded in the conviction that nuclear 
technology is still a useful means of extending American 
political and economic influence. It was argued that 1) if 
we do not do it someone else will—someone less interested 
in exercising bilateral controls to prevent the abuse of 
this technology and hardware; that 2) this will increase the 
political dependence of these nations on America and there­
fore allow the United States to influence the uses to which 
the technology may be put; and that 3) such exports are good
73for business. These same kinds of arguments are often 
used to justify conventional arms sales to volatile areas.
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The first point is probably true, and this is the 
heart of the problem. International commercial competition 
has a propulsive effect, accelerating the pace of acquisition 
of nuclear weapons capabilities and reducing the kind of 
political restraints that can be exercised. It is not clear 
whether the initiative for nuclear reactors came from the 
Egyptians or potential suppliers, nor it is clear how 
nuclear power fits into Egyptian economic development plans. 
It does seem clear that the "someone else" in question is 
more likely France than the Soviet Union, although the 
latter may step in the wake of the initial check on the
74 . .American offers. Competition among political allies like 
the United States, France, West Germany, and Canada in the 
nuclear field resembles more and more the competition in 
conventional armaments exports, with even more potentially 
disastrous effects on international stability. This kind 
of competition suggests that if nonproliferation objectives 
are to be met, the agreement of all states capable of 
exporting nuclear capabilities must be obtained; the United 
States might be advised to spend less time negotiating 
with countries like France.
As to the second point, the use of nuclear technology 
to make others politically dependent on the United States 
seems increasingly chimerical. Under the best of circum­
stances, the successful exercise of control over other 
nations' undesirable nuclear programs—as opposed to the 
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successful promotion of nuclear energy—has been dependent 
upon a broad pattern of political interdependence, an 
effective American monopoly of a relevant technology, and 
the American government’s willingness to use that monopoly
75for political purposes.
The third rationale seems to be a more potent explana­
tion for these proposed exports, and one that is relevant 
for other nuclear exporters' policies as well. With serious 
balance of payments problems, the United States naturally 
looks to its advanced technologies as a source of overseas 
earnings. International competition for such exports is 
likely to make governments less particular about the long­
term political implications of their actions and more 
included to exaggerate the short-term political benefits. 
Industries are eager to compete for purely economic reasons. 
But the arms control consequences of these policies continue 
to grow in importance. International competition in reactors 
enrichment facilities and fuel reprocessing plants is only 
one step short of the point where a nation like France sells
7 6 nuclear weapons on the open market.
The prospects for the successful exercise of political 
restraint through nuclear exports are dim at best. Only two 
things seem relatively certain: that the United States has 
an economic interest in nuclear exports, and that these 
exports will increase the nuclear weapons capabilities of 
countries like Egypt and Israel.
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PROLIFERATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
The Indian detonation raises the problem of the mix 
of domestic and foreign policy calculations in a decision 
to go nuclear. Because of the international impact of the 
Indian explosion, it is assumed that the decision to 
demonstrate a PNE was the result of international political 
calculations of the highest kind. And yet, there are 
reasons to believe that more mundane domestic political 
considerations may have been almost as important; one is 
tempted to say that the test was allowed to take place in
77 spite of its international implications. What is important 
is that possession of a nuclear capability can become a 
dynamic element in the decision-making process, influencing 
estimations of the incentives and disincentives of going 
nuclear.
Arms control analyses tend to focus on the inter­
national milieu as the prime policy determinant, and anti­
proliferation policies usually aim at achieving international 
conditions that would logically decrease incentives to go 
nuclear. This approach has two kinds of inherent problems: 
the superpowers' consensus on a stable nuclear deterrent 
as an arms control objective in practice re-enforces some 
other nations' incentives to go nuclear; and to the extent 
that a decision to go nuclear may reflect domestic political 
conditions, nonproliferation strategies focusing on the inter­
national milieu may be only marginally relevant or even 
counterproductive.
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Japan is a case in point. An examination of Japan’s 
exposed position, a neighbor of two nuclear powers in an 
area where others may emerge, suggests that Japan may seri­
ously consider a nuclear option. Only Soviet and Chinese 
nuclear disarmament could remove these Japanese strategic 
concerns. Japan has a nuclear weapons capability based in 
part on nuclear energy technology imported from the United 
States. Therefore it is argued that the credibility of 
American nuclear deterrent commitment to Japan must be main­
tained lest the Japanese go nuclear. But in fact, domestic 
political opposition to a nuclear option is strong in Japan 
among those who are most opposed to reliance on the United 
States for its nuclear deterrent—the left opposition par­
ties, the scientific community, and public opinion in general. 
This domestic opposition constitutes the major restraint on 
those few in Japan who would like to have nuclear weapons. 
American policies favoring a Japanese conventional military 
build-up and emphasis on a nuclear deterrent through the 
Security Treaty are rationalized in part because of their 
antiproliferation effects. But these policies find most 
support in Japan among the only political elements that 
favor nuclear weapons—among some of the military and right-
7 8 wing factions of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.
In effect, American policies tend to favor those Japanese 
who are least committed to the goal of nonproliferation.
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The application of the general principles of nonproliferation 
to particular domestic political situations may have equivocal 
effects.
The domestic political determinants of a nuclear option 
are inherently more difficult to influence from the outside 
than the international determinants. American arms control 
policies have been justified in part as designed to give the 
United States leverage over the domestic development of 
nuclear energy in other nations by making them dependent on 
it for nuclear technology and fuels. But in practice, the 
United States has been most successful in promoting nuclear 
energy. The American development of atomic energy estab­
lishments in dozens of nations has helped to raise the 
international level of sophistication in nuclear technology 
to the point where there are alternatives to dependence on 
the United States. The existence of these alternatives makes 
sanctions like nuclear fuel cut-offs a high cost option in 
political and economic terms with little prospect of long
79term success. Without this kind of leverage, nuclear 
exports become an economic exchange like any other.
International commercial competition is part of a 
broader process through which the political bases for the 
successful exercise of American influence have been eroded. 
This erosion and the general trend toward diversity in the 
international system are crucial because the relevance of 
expedients like safeguards to the problem of nuclear 
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proliferation depends on the political milieu in which 
they operate. Safeguards are only as effective as the 
political bonds that link the members of the international 
system. Even in the immediate postwar period, French 
dependence upon and confidence in the United States were 
not sufficient to prevent the French from persisting in a 
nuclear weapons program despite strong American opposition. 
The improvement of national technical capabilities was a
8 0 principal means of asserting French independence. In the 
future nations whose political perceptions and interests are 
as different from America's as Egypt's, Israel's, and Iran's 
will be even less restrained by American political pressures 
than France was in the past, and will use their technical 
capabilities to pursue their independent interests.
But whereas American policy in the past made the French 
nuclear option a costly policy choice, present American 
policy in effect reduces the costs and difficulty of acquiring 
a nuclear option, exporting on near commercial terms not 
only weapons-relevant nuclear technology but advanced deliv­
ery systems as well. These policies should be reevaluated.
From the beginning the "nuclear dilemma" has been that 
the peaceful uses of nuclear technology cannot be promoted 
without promoting nuclear weapons potential. One must be 
convinced of the overwhelming advantages of the former in 
order to run the risks of the latter. Since the international 
political conditions that would render benign the spread of 
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nuclear technology have failed to materialize, it is necessary 
to reassess the desirability of nuclear energy from an arms 
control perspective.
Here there is a convergence between arms control 
advocates and those at the domestic level who have attacked 
nuclear energy because of their concerns for public health 
and safety, and environmental degradation. Analysts who in 
the past have been concerned with the problem of devising 
adequate safeguards to detect the diversion of fissile 
materials by governments from nuclear plants to weapons pur­
poses have now turned their attention to the necessity of 
devising security measures to prevent the diversion of fis­
sile materials from the nuclear industry by criminals or
81political dissidents. The opportunities for such mischief, 
with international ramifications, will grow as the commercial­
ization of nuclear energy continues, especially when and if
8 2 plutonium becomes a major fuel in the nuclear industry.
The need for adequate nuclear security measures must be added 
to the need for protection against risks to public health 
and safety, uncertainties regarding nuclear plant performance, 
the threat of environmental degradation, and the unresolved 
problems of waste disposal, further reducing the public accept-
8 3 ability and economic competitivity of nuclear energy.
ENERGY POLICY AND NONPROLIFERATION ALTERNATIVES
Up to now, governments have persistently exaggerated the 
promise of nuclear energy and down-played its negative poten­
tial. The energy crisis has made nuclear power more attractive 
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than ever before, and resulted in projected increases in 
future dependence on nuclear power. But there are alter­
natives to these policies that would have both profound 
domestic economic and political implications as well as a 
direct bearing on nuclear proliferation prospects. There 
are indications of interest in some of these measures in
84Congress. Alternatives range from the most general 
reassessment of the viability of heavy dependence on nuclear 
energy in meeting future energy requirements, to more modest 
attempts to shape the development of nuclear power in ways 
more consistent with arms control objectives, to limited 
attempts to monitor the development of independent nuclear
A *
weapons capabilities abroad. These latter, more limited 
kinds of measures are those that depart least from established 
policies and therefore least threaten established interests; 
they have attracted the most attention from arms control 
advocates and have the best chance of being enacted in some 
part.
The political commitment to greater independence from 
imported energy sources, the existence of domestic political 
and economic interests in favor of commercial nuclear energy, 
and an increasingly competitive international system make it 
unlikely that more restrictive policies in nuclear energy 
will be enacted. Only a convergence of domestic political 
opposition to nuclear energy and the according of a higher 
priority to the threat of nuclear proliferation could off­
set the impact of problems like the energy crisis. At present,
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such a convergence seems unlikely. But in considering 
broader, if less likely, kinds of alternatives, the defini­
tion of that which is possible may be widened.
I
1) The measures with the most comprehensive effects 
in terms of limiting nuclear proliferation are those that 
would retard the international increase in dependence on 
nuclear energy. These measures would help impede the 
growth of bureaucratic and economic interests which form 
the necessary infrastructure for a nuclear capability and 
which might serve as a basis of political support for a 
nuclear weapons option. But most important these steps 
would make acquiring a nuclear option most costly and 
obvious. The economic obstacles could be crucial, partic­
ularly where investment in national fuel processing and 
enrichment plants is concerned. In an inversion of the 
logic that has prevailed up to now in NWSs, in the future 
a nuclear energy program may be necessary to justify the
8 5 costs of a nuclear weapons option.
As an alternative to increased dependence on OPEC,
* 
nuclear energy represents a kind of "technological fix" for 
an essentially political problem. But the economic viability 
of nuclear energy is open to question. It is only with the 
enormous increases in the price of oil in the last year that 
nuclear power clearly became economically competitive, and 
those oil prices must remain high to maintain the compet­
itiveness of nuclear power. But ironically, the oil crisis 
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has also helped to reduce the attractiveness of nuclear 
energy by making it increasingly difficult to finance. In 
America and elsewhere the relatively lower operating costs 
of nuclear plants is accompanied by higher initial capital
8 6investment, and high interest rates have made nuclear 
power prohibitively expensive to finance. Sixty percent of 
the nuclear power plants on order or planned have been cancelled
8 7in America in the last several months. Economically hard- 
pressed countries like Britain, Italy, and France are also
I 
finding it difficult to finance their projected increased 
dependence on nuclear power.88
The United States has embarked on a limited sort of 
nuclear moratorium and other nations may be compelled to 
do likewise. Without massive government intervention, the 
American nuclear industry is headed for a marked decline. 
Simply as an arms control measure, it might be opportune to
/
make a political virtue out of economic necessity and pro­
claim a nuclear moratorium, including the suspension of the
8C export of nuclear reactors and fuel reprocessing technologies.
While each nation has its own distinctive energy problems, 
this kind of example could help to reduce the image of the 
"inevitability" of high rates of dependence on nuclear power. 
Sweden has already set an example in this respect, reducing
90 not only projected growth in energy consumption as well.
A moratorium might also help reduce the competetive export 
drive in politically sensitive nuclear hardware. Without 
government help, the American nuclear industry would find 
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it difficult to compete on the international market and 
other governments might be less inclined to promote the 
exports of their own hard pressed nuclear industries. But 
most importantly, this kind of measure would provide a 
political basis for more restrictive policies in exporting 
nuclear technology. Unlike its policies regarding nuclear 
weapons, the United States would be setting the example for 
the conduct it wants other nations to follow.
The American government is currently under pressure to 
come to the aid of the domestic nuclear energy industry; the 
Kissinger proposal to artifically maintain the high price 
of oil is calculated in part to make investment in alterna­
tive energy sources like nuclear power economically viable. 
The government is also under pressure to give more direct 
support to the power industry to help finance nuclear instal­
lations; without such support, utilities will be unable to 
meet the goals the President has set for installed nuclear
91 capacity by the year 1985. Should either of these two 
policies fail to win congressional approval, there could be 
a positive arms control impact. An optimal solution would 
discriminate against nuclear power while encouraging the 
development of alternative energy technologies.
2) A second range of alternatives involves the shaping 
of the increased dependence on nuclear energy in ways more 
compatible with arms control objectives. Here, two different 
courses might be followed. One course, outlined above, would 
be to reduce government support for nuclear energy and 
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thereby reduce its economic competitiveness; this would 
limit future increases in dependence on nuclear power.
The other would be to de-commercialize nuclear energy by 
direct government takeover of the nuclear industry and the 
subjection of nuclear energy to rigid nonproliferation 
criteria. Government takeover alone is no panacea; govern­
ment participation and government regulation of the nuclear 
industry is high everywhere and has almost universally 
resulted in government promotion. Government control and 
government commitment are needed to limit the degree of 
future dependence on nuclear energy and to more carefully 
restrict the export of nuclear reactors, fuels, and related 
technologies.
Domestic measures of this kind include resisting the 
pressure to recycle plutonium in power reactors and refusing 
to accelerate the commercialization of the plutonium-fueled
92fast breeder reactor. In terms of fuel supplies, the 
ideal would be to maintain the role of governments as the 
sources of enriched uranium through terms and prices that 
are low enough to discourage private competition while being 
high enough to discourage heavy dependence on nuclear energy.
International analogues of these measures would be a 
refusal to fabricate plutonium fuels for other nations and 
perhaps reversion to the policy of buying back plutonium 
produced in American-supplied reactors. The "international­
ization" of enrichment plants and reprocessing facilities 
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would also help limit proliferation. These kinds of 
proposals seem more likely if governments dominate the 
fuel cycle than if private economic interests do so.
International cooperation might take the form of a 
cartel of nuclear exporting nations. This would limit 
competition among these nations on the basis of a political 
consensus to seek to limit proliferation. For example, 
a cartel might prohibit the exports of enrichment technology 
and fuel reprocessing plants and in return furnish fuels 
supplies on a secure, long-term basis. Informal agreements 
among nuclear exporters might achieve the same general aim 
with fewer negative political problems vis-a-vis clients, 
but without a formal cartel, it would be difficult to maintain 
the integrity of the agreement over time.
The principal obstacle here is, of course, the lack of 
clear political commitment to the priority of nonproliferation 
which is a prerequisite to the success of these kinds of 
policies. As energy and international economic problems 
have grown in importance, nonproliferation has receded as 
a concern of policy makers. But solutions to energy and 
economic problems that run counter to the objective of 
nonproliferation will be very short-sighted. The energy 
crisis is a part of a more general emerging "new international 
economic order" based on demands for a "global redistribution 
of wealth." The inevitable conflicts attending these inter­
national adjustments can only be more difficult to cope with 
when they are accompanied by further nuclear proliferation.
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Without an overarching political commitment to 
nonproliferation, sub-governmental units often work at 
cross purposes. Here there is a convergence between 
arms control advocates and those who seek to exert more 
effective political controls on bureaucratic actors. In 
the United States, the division of the functions of the 
AEC into two government agencies may serve to reduce the 
influence of proponents of nuclear energy in the govern­
ment and strengthen political controls, with positive 
collateral effects on nonproliferation.
The assertion of tighter government controls over 
the international nuclear industry would at a certain 
point have to face the problem of multinational corporations. 
Nuclear technology transfers by firms like General Electric 
and Westinghouse may not always be subject to government 
review, especially as commercialization proceeds. Govern­
ment and private industry have differed in their perceptions
93 of the demands of national security in the past, and may 
be expected to do so more frequently in the future. Here 
there is a convergence of interests between arms control 
objectives and the attempts at the national level, in the 
UN, and in bodies like the EEC and OECD to regulate the 
activities of multinational corporations.
The emphasis here is on the control of nuclear hardware 
rather than scientific information, but the fundamental 
objections to these kinds of controls go back to the roots 
of the debate over nuclear secrecy. The argument that it is 
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impractical to seek to restrict information is truer today 
than in the immediate postwar period. The aim of a more 
restrictive policy cannot be to prevent a nation from going 
nuclear; the information necessary to do so has long been 
available publicly. The more modest aim is twofold: to 
increase the difficulty and, in particular, the costs of 
acquiring a nuclear weapons option independently; and to 
reduce the responsibility of America and other nuclear 
technology exporters in the process by which other nations 
move towards a nuclear weapons capability. Whether such 
modest aims are justified by the political and economic 
costs of a more restrictive policy is open to question.
But in the determination of the wider costs and 
benefits of such a policy, another argument made against 
the restriction of scientific information must be weighed: 
it is argued that the restriction of scientific information, 
and by implication the restriction of private economic 
activity, is wrong in principle, inimical to a free society 
and to technological progress. These considerations must 
be weighed against the threat to freedom implicit in the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and of the compromises of 
freedom manifest in nuclear safeguards and security measures. 
The costs of present policies may ultimately exceed the 
present costs of alternatives.
3) Attention to international inspections has intensified 
as the 1975 NPT Review Conference has neared. Safeguard in­
spection agreements like those negotiated under the NPT must
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be considered as one of the more limited kinds of anti-
94 proliferation measures. Inspection by the IAEA is 
designed to detect diversion, not to prevent it. But 
the threat of early detection acts as a deterrent to the 
diversion of fissile materials to weapons programs. Safe­
guards are political expedients, not technical solutions 
to the problem of nuclear proliferation. The commitment 
assumed by adherence to the NPT and submission to inter­
national inspection is a political constraint and can, 
therefore, make a contribution to nonproliferation. But 
the principal danger of safeguards is that they'might 
become an end in themselves instead of a step towards an 
evolving, cooperative international system in which nuclear 
weapons are less relevant.
The institution of an international safeguards inspec­
tion system may indicate a more cooperative, integrative kind 
of international system. But present demands for more strin­
gent safeguards, coupled with pressure for uniform inter­
national nuclear security measures, suggest a rather less 
optimistic set of expectations. More restrictive measures 
on the export of nuclear technology are also suggestive of 
a fundamental pessimism. But it seems unlikely that such 
measures would have any effect but to confirm already 
established trends, and would not in themselves cause a 
negative evolution of the international system.
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Over time it seeks likely that safeguards procedures 
may provide an unacceptable degree of technical assurance. 
This will in part reflect the size of the operations being 
monitored: even materials accounting systems which are 99
percent effective, applied to processes through which pass 
tons of enriched uranium or plutonium, will have a percentage 
of materials-unaccounted-for (MUF) amounting to dozens of
9 6warhead equivalents. While such accounting procedures could 
become more precise with technical improvements, the incre­
ments in precision are likely to be gained only with dispro­
portionate increases in the costs of the operations. In 
other words, in the future, safeguards may be less effective, 
or more costly and more intrusive—and conceivably, all three. 
In a commercially competitive situation, a difference of even 
a few percent of the total cost of production can mean the 
difference between economic viability and non-viability. The 
temptation for governments and industries to cut corners, 
unrelated to any intent to deviate materials for weapons 
purposes, will be very strong. Once the integrity of the 
safeguards system is compromised, the possibilities for 
deviation of various kinds will increase enormously.
But more importantly, in a world in which the incentive 
to go nuclear is far from lacking, future nuclear weapons 
forces are likely to arise either from the unilateral denunci­
ation of the NPT by a nation undetected in any improper 
deviation, or by a nation not party to the Treaty. This is 
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not a problem for safeguards: it is a broader kind of 
political problem. The dominant trends in international 
politics are such that the political will and technical 
capability of the nuclear exporters are less effective as 
restraints, while in countries that import nuclear technology, 
the political power and technical competence of those groups 
which might favor a future nuclear option are growing. Under 
these circumstances, safeguards may simply serve to facilitate 
and hasten the creation of nuclear weapons options in a score
97 of additional nations.
There are no absolute barriers to acquiring a nuclear 
weapons force, but there are relative obstacles. There is 
a range of policy alternatives that could slow the pace of 
the evolution of nuclear capabilities, particularly in those 
countries which have yet to achieve a completely independent 
civil nuclear energy program. Whether the time gained by 
adopting these alternatives would be wisely used depends 
on an even wider range of considerations. Current trends 
favor the subordination of nonproliferation concerns to inter­
national economic calculations and domestic political con­
siderations. But the ways in which the choices of advanced 
industrial countries in international economic and national 
energy policies affect arms control prospects should still 
be borne in mind. While it may be tempting to hope that the 
institution of an international inspection system under the 
NPT marks the beginning of a positive new era in international 
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politics, there are also reasons to fear that the problems 
of the nuclear age have really only just begun.
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